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Non technical summary
The …nancial crisis of [2007] [2008] has pushed concerns about systemic risk and its measurement at the forefront of both academic research and supervisory policy agenda. In particular, ongoing work by the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board striving to set new regulatory requirements for Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFI) requires that an agreement can be reached on which characteristics make a …nan-cial institution more prone than others to be severely hit by system-wide shocks (systemic resilience or participation) or to propagate such shocks to other institutions, thereby amplifying their overall impact (systemic contribution). Recently, several academic contributions have proposed high frequency measures of individual institutions'systemic importance and systemic exposure that rely exclusively on public market information (like bank stock prices or CDS premia), using sophisticated econometric techniques. While they have received notable attention, given the real-time monitoring they allow, these market-based systemic risk measures remain complex tools in which the determinants of the vulnerability of a given institution to systemic events remain unde…ned. As such, they do not fully meet the needs of regulators, which would have an easier task if they could rely on indicators based on more usual metrics of the …nancial soundness of institutions. Nor is it clearly established that these indicators, which are generally highly procyclical, can prove forward-looking enough to provide valuable early warning signals to bank regulators ahead of a …nancial turmoil.
We look in this paper at one particular but popular statistical measure of systemic resilience, the so-called Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) of Acharya et al. (2010) and assess empirically for a large sample of big US banks how well this indicator meets such practical concerns.
We …rst estimate Brownlees and Engle's (BE) dynamic version of the MES on a daily basis over the period from 1996 to 2010 for a sample of 65 large US bank holding companies, for which we have access to detailed balance-sheet information. We then run panel regressions of quarterly bank MES on selected bank balance-sheet variables that are routinely monitored by bank regulators, thus putting the MES to a weak form of market e¢ ciency test. The regression results suggest that the information delivered by the MES is consistent with characteristics that are intuitively viewed as sources of bank fragility, like reliance on wholesale funding, low pro…tability and low quality of assets. The e¤ects of a low pro…tabil-ity and of a larger share of non-performing loans on the MES were signi…cantly ampli…ed 2 during the recent crisis.
Finally, using the 2007-2009 crisis as a natural experiment, we ask whether the MES as measured before the crisis (i.e. taking an ex ante view) would have been useful to identify which institutions were the most likely to be severely hit should a crisis occur. Based on cross-sectional rank correlations as well as cross-sectional regressions, we conclude that some standard balance-sheet ratios already routinely monitored by regulators, like the ratio of tier-one capital to risk-weighted assets would have been more useful than the MES at predicting which banks were bound to su¤er the most severe equity losses during the crisis.
Introduction
The …nancial crisis of 2007-and in particular the widespread disruption of …nancial markets triggered by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in the Autumn of 2008 has pushed concerns about systemic risk and its measurement at the forefront of both academic research and supervisory policy agenda. In particular, ongoing work by the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board striving to set new regulatory requirements for Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFI) requires that an agreement can be reached on which characteristics make a …nancial institution more prone than others to be severely hit by system-wide shocks (systemic resilience or participation) or to propagate such shocks to other institutions, thereby amplifying their overall impact (systemic contribution). 1 Recently, several academic contributions have aimed to account for the interconnectedness of institutions as well as the rapidity of contagion of a systemic event and proposed high frequency measures of individual institutions'systemic importance and systemic exposure that rely exclusively on public market information (like bank stock prices or CDS premia), using sophisticated econometric techniques (cf. e.g. Adrian received notable attention, given the real-time monitoring they allow, these market-based systemic risk measures remain complex tools in which the determinants of the vulnerability of a given institution to systemic events remain unde…ned. As such, they do not fully meet the needs of regulators (Drehman and Tarashev, 2010) , which would have an easier task if they could rely on indicators based on more usual metrics of the …nancial soundness of institutions. Nor is it clearly established that these indicators, which are generally highly procyclical, can prove forward-looking enough to provide valuable early warning signals to bank regulators ahead of a …nancial turmoil.
We look in this paper at one particular but popular statistical measure of systemic resilience, the so-called Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) and assess empirically for a large sample of big US banks how well this indicator meets such practical concerns. First, we investigate how the MES reconciles with more standards measures of …nancial weaknesses 1 Analytically, one may want to distinguish between situations where bank A reacts more than others to an exogenous shock and situations where Bank A is a source or an amplifyer of endogenous systemic events. Both dimensions of systemic importance are in practice clearly inter-related. The participation vs contribution approach was proposed by Drehman and Tarashev (2010) .
as computed from individual institutions' balance-sheet information. 2 Second, we check whether the MES is of greater help than more standard balance-sheet indicators to identify ex ante which institution would be the most a¤ected should systemic risk really materialize.
Recently adapted to systemic risk measurement from an earlier literature on riskmanagement at the …rm level (cf. notably Tasche, 2000) , the MES of a …nancial institution is de…ned as the expected equity loss per dollar invested in this …rm if the overall market declines by a certain substantial amount (then identi…ed to a "tail event" in the market).
To overcome the limitations of historical measures of the MES, in particular their lack of ‡exibility, Brownlees and Engle (2010) recently proposed a multi-step modeling approach based on GARCH, Dynamic Conditional Correlations (DCC) and non-parametric tail estimators. Recently, Acharya et al. (2010) found that the MES of a large sample of US …nancial …rms (banks and non-banks), as measured on the verge of the last crisis, was a good predictor of the total decline in equity valuation that these …rms actually experienced during the crisis.
We …rst estimate Brownlees and Engle's (BE) MES on a daily basis over the period from 1996 to 2010 for a sample of 65 large US bank holding companies, for which we have access to detailed balance-sheet information. A simple look at the median MES con…rms that this indicator does a good job in tracking episodes of …nancial turmoil, which makes it a potentially relevant coincident indicator of the exposure of individual banks to systemic risk. Interestingly, we …nd that the half-decade leading up to the crisis was characterized by a very low level of average MES, re ‡ecting in turn extraordinary low levels of bank stock volatility, as well as a very low dispersion of individual MES. We view this as indicative of a phase of exacerbated optimism where investors in bank equity did not pay enough attention to individual sources of bank vulnerability.
We then run panel regressions of quarterly bank MES on selected bank balance-sheet variables that are routinely monitored by bank regulators, thus putting the MES to a weak form of market e¢ ciency test. The regression results suggest that the information delivered by the MES is consistent with characteristics that are intuitively viewed as sources of bank fragility or systemic importance. Indeed, banks that generally rely more on wholesale funding, are less pro…table, have a higher share of non-performing loans and lend more to corporates turn out to have a higher MES on average. The e¤ects of a low pro…tability and of a larger share of non-performing loans on the MES were signi…cantly ampli…ed during the recent crisis.
Finally, using the 2007-2009 crisis as a natural experiment, we ask whether the MES as measured before the crisis (i.e. taking an ex ante view) would have been useful to identify which institutions were the most likely to be severely hit should a crisis occur.
Based on cross-sectional rank correlations as well as cross-sectional regressions, we conclude that some standard balance-sheet ratios already routinely monitored by regulators, like the ratio of tier-one capital to risk-weighted assets would have been more useful than the MES at predicting which banks were bound to su¤er the most severe equity losses during the crisis. Although we focus in this paper on a speci…c model-based approach of the MES (the dynamic MES of BE), it is important to note that this conclusion still holds whether we look at the dynamic MES we estimated using the BE method, a simple historical version of the MES, or, for a sub-sample of banks also considered in the rankings posted on the Systemic risk website of NYU Stern, using the simulated long-run extension of the MES recently advocated by Acharya et al. (2012) . 3 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we estimate daily MES for a panel of large US banks. In section 3 we present our bank balance-sheet dataset and explore the link between balance sheet indicators of bank …nancial fragility and quarterly version of the MES for our panel of banks. In section 4, using rank tests, we assess the predictive power of the MES compared with usual standard banking risk metrics in the light of the last crisis. Finally, section 5 concludes.
The Marginal Expected Shortfall
De…nition
We focus in this study on a speci…c measure of the sensitivity of a …nancial …rm to systemic 2010), we de…ne the MES of a …nancial …rm as its short-run expected equity loss conditional on the market taking a loss greater than its Value-at-Risk at %. Let us denote r i;t the daily (log) stock return of the …rm and r m;t the daily index return of the larger market the …rm belongs to. Then the MES reads:
or
where C is a constant corresponding to what we want to de…ne as "tail risk" in the market.
Let us also de…ne the Expected shortfall of the market (ES) as the expected loss in the index conditional on this loss being greater than C, that is: ES t = E t (r t+1 j r t+1 < C).
Whenever all the considered …rms belong to the market, it is straightforward to see that the MES of one …rm is simply the derivative of the market's ES with respect to the …rm's market share (or capitalization), hence the term "marginal". Note that in this case, the MES of a …rm can be interpreted as re ‡ecting its participation in overall systemic risk.
However, it is still possible to de…ne the same statistic whenever the observed …rm does not belong to the market index. Rather than a measure of how a particular …rm's risk adds to the market risk, the MES should then be viewed simply as a measure of the sensitivity (or resilience) of this …rm's stock price to exceptionally bad market events.
Data and estimation
We follow closely the econometric methodology developed by Brownlees We estimate these individual bank MES over the period from January 1996 to March 2010. 6 Banks' stock prices are taken from Datastream. System-wide events are gauged using ‡uctuations in the S&P500 Financials index returns. In the rest of the paper, we set the constant threshold C that de…nes a "systemic" tail event to a daily loss larger than 2.91%. This threshold corresponds to the VaR at 95% of the S&P Financials index over the period from 1996 to 2010, or to the VaR at 97.5% of the same index over the pre-crisis period (prior to August 2007). As a consequence, it is important to note that the estimated MES captures banks' equity sensitivity to tail market events that, although "extreme", remain relatively frequent (i.e. market losses that occured on a long run average less often than once in two months in the pre-crisis world). Figure 2 suggests that, as most available statistical measures of systemic importance or resilience, the dynamic MES tends to be procyclical, as protracted periods of …nancial distress are generally associated with higher MES. 7 First, over the late 1990s and early 2000s, the median sensitivity to system-wide shocks proved relatively low, although some variability can be accounted for by some of the events mentioned above, while cross-sectional heterogeneity was high, at least when compared to the median value. Then cross-sectional heterogeneity in banks'MES collapsed to low levels over the …ve years preceding the last crisis, which may be viewed as a signal that equity investors were then paying (too) little attention to idiosyncratic factors of bank fragility. Finally, the outburst of the last crisis triggered a surge in the median MES associated with a general surge in stock market volatility, but also a rise in cross-sectional heterogeneity.
Bank characteristics and MES: exploring the missing link
In this section, we investigate how the MES, which is a statistical indicator of the sensitivity of bank equity valuation to tail market events, can be related to commonly considered measures of bank balance-sheet vulnerability and risk-taking. In other words, we aim to rationalize the assessment of banks'exposure to systemic risk provided by the MES. In their paper, BE raised the issue already, but they limited their investigation to a preliminary regression, focusing on only two main sources of …nancial …rms'heterogeneity: the size of the institution, as gauged by its market capitalization, and its total leverage at market prices. They conclude that bigger and more leveraged …rms (banks and non-banks) have a larger MES and that the positive correlation between leverage and MES is higher when the market is bearish.
We broaden and systematize here their analysis, while focusing more speci…cally on BHCs (as opposed to investment banks and shadow banks), and regress our estimated MES on a comprehensive set of balance-sheet ratios that are usually monitored by regulators to assess banks' …nancial soundness. Since balance-sheet information is only available at a quarterly frequency, we consider in the following a quarterly version of the estimated daily individual MES series, simply taking the median of the MES over a quarter. Thus, for each bank, we de…ne:
3.1 Balance-sheet variables and preliminary statistics We thus model the MES as a function of (1) bank capitalization or book leverage, that we assess in this section using both a simple book equity capital to book assets ratio (CAR) or the supervisory ratio of tier 1 equity to risk weighted assets (CARTIER1), (2) reliance on wholesale funding may prove to be a major source of bank fragility in times of systemic liquidity stress. We thus also include among our regressors (5) a ratio of wholesale (non-deposit short term) funding to total liabilities (WFUND). We also proxy for the degree of sectorial diversi…cation of assets and lending business pro…les using two additional ratios of (6) commercial and industry loans (CIL) and (7) mortgage loans (HOL) to total assets.
Finally, since the biggest banks in our sample account for a non-negligible share of the S&P500 Financials, omitting size in MES regressions could importantly bias the estimated coe¢ cients of other bank characteristics. We thus take (8) the log of total assets to capture size e¤ects (SIZE).
Bank balance sheet datasets typically exhibit many outlier observations which may re ‡ect mergers and acquisitions (M&A), other unobserved structural changes in banks' operating business, or even statistical errors. Using the BHC M&A database compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, we identi…ed 60 important M&A operations for our sample of banks since 1996. These operations appeared to explain most of the outliers that we could …lter out using a simple preliminary statistical detection procedure. 8 As shown in Table 1 , the impact of a M&A in terms of quarterly total assets growth of the acquiring bank varies substantially, with a median impact of around 46%. On the basis of this evidence, we sorted identi…ed M&A observations into two categories, denoted as small mergers and large mergers respectively, and included the corresponding dummies in our regressions below. We then dropped the remaining unexplained outlier observations (0.3% of all observations). Reserve, we identi…ed 42 changes from BHC to FHC status in our sample of banks and created a dummy variable taking the value of one for the observations under FHC status. Table 2 presents some summary statistics for our variables over the period from 1996 to 2010. Consistently with the exceptionally high levels of the MES observed after mid-2007, statistics for the crisis period and for the more quiet times before the onset of the crisis are presented separately. A …rst look at the right panel proves enough that, even in quiet times and although we restricted our sample to some of the largest US banks, our bank data still present a substantial degree of heterogeneity, notably regarding leverage, size and bank assets structure. Furthermore, comparing statistics for crisis vs normal times highlights important changes in some variables. Notably, the crisis period is associated with a signi…cant surge in non-performing loans. Interestingly, the average capitalization ratio increases by 1.3 percentage points during the crisis, which is consistent with both stories of deleveraging during that period and with capital injections by the US authorities as part as the o¢ cial packages launched to shore up the US banking system after the Lehman panic. . Solvency (tier one capital) ratios are then negatively correlated with the proportion of C&I loans on the asset side, which in turn is consistent with the higher regulatory risk weights that are put on loans to non-…nancial …rms under the Basel I and to some extent the Basel II regulations. Both measures of leverage (CAR and CARTIER1) are strongly positively correlated, which suggests not to include them simultaneously in our regressions. As expected, the return on assets is negatively correlated with the ratio of non-performing loans in all times, but the correlation becomes strongly negative during the crisis only.
Estimation and results
In this section, we present our panel regressions of individual MES on bank characteristics in more details. The empirical model reads as follows:
M ES i;t = 0 + i + :Z i;t 1 + :Z i;t 1 :I t2 Crisis (4)
2: I Q1 + 3 :I Q2 + 4: I Q4 + u i;t (6) where Z i;t is the vector of bank balance-sheet variables detailed in section 3.1 above.
Note that instead of using directly the SIZE variable, we …rst orthogonalize it with respect to all other bank variables given the high and signi…cant correlation with the other banking variables in order to better capture true size e¤ects, as in De Jonghe (2010).
Beside the dummy variables correcting for small and large mergers as well as for the FHC status, quarterly dummies were also added to control for seasonal e¤ects (notably end of year e¤ects) as balance sheet variables are not seasonally adjusted. As said, running this regression can be viewed as weak rationality test of the market-based measure of bank riskiness provided by the MES, by comparing the MES with at least a part of the information set available to investors. We thus lag all regressors (except dummies) by one quarter to take into account the fact that investors may react with some delay to changes in banks'
…nancial conditions due to reporting lags, so that the current MES is more likely to re ‡ect balance-sheet information about the previous quarter. 9 The …rst two columns of Table 4 present the results of regressions of individual MES on selected bank characteristics over the period from 1996 to 2010, while the last two columns refer to regressions that also include bank characteristics interacted with a crisis dummy.
In each case, bank leverage is measured alternatively as the unweighted equity to capital ratio or as the regulatory ratio of tier-one equity to risk-weighted assets. As suggested by The previous section shows that the information summarized by the MES can be broadly reconciled with usual balance sheet indicators of bank weakness. This is however not enough son correlation coe¢ cients, we also compute Spearman rank correlation coe¢ cients, which describe the degree of rank correlation between two variables, thus accomodating possible non-linear relationships. Table 5 presents the results for all banks. 11 Looking at the …rst column, we …nd that the rank of tier one solvency ratios in 2007Q2 would have been a relatively good advanced indicator of the rank of losses to come, with a Spearman rank correlation coe¢ cient above 50% in absolute value. Size, non-performing loans and liquidity of assets as measured ex ante also exhibit good predictive properties of the rank of losses under systemic stress, with absolute rank correlation coe¢ cients between 35% and 40%.
In contrast, the correlation of the MES before the crisis with the cumulated losses borne during the crisis is below 20% and not signi…cant.
Importantly, although our measure of the MES is model-based (and closely follows BE's dynamic approach), this last result is not model-dependent, since we obtain similar results when we replace the dynamic MES with a simple historical measure of the MES as computed over a three-year rolling window. Column 2 also shows that the results remain qualitatively unchanged when we use the more common Pearson correlation coe¢ cient.
The rest of the Table provides correlations of the ex post losses with ex ante bank MES and balance sheet characteristics as measured at earlier dates. While the overall picture remains the same, we note that the correlation with the ex ante solvency ratio tends to increase, not decrease, with longer forecasting horizons, while the correlation with the MES eventually drops to zero. 12 While the MES as measured before a major crisis is less correlated with equity losses observed ex post than other indicators, it may be the case that it nevertheless contains some 1 1 Note that, for consistency, we limit the exercise here to the 61 banks that remain listed up to June 2009. Some institutions in the sample (namely Wachovia, National City Corp, Commerce Bancorp, Unionbancal) were indeed merged into other banking groups during the crisis. We checked however that the results of the ranking tests remain unchanged when these four BHC are included in the sample. 1 2 For robustness, we checked that our results still qualitatively hold when we split our set of banks by size (above/below the median). See the related table in Appendix C useful information at the margin. To check this, Table 8 shows the results of cross-sectional regressions of observed SES over the crisis period on ex ante MES and bank balance sheet ratios, as measured at di¤erent points in time before the crisis. Again, we …nd that the marginal explanatory power of the MES is insigni…cant, while ex ante standard ratios alone can predict some 45% of the cross-sectional variance in cumulated equity losses during the crisis.
As a …nancial crisis unfolds, it may be of crucial importance for the regulator to be able to identify quickly the few most endangered institutions. With this in mind, we compare in Table 6 the rankings of the top 10 most severely hurt banks in our sample during the crisis with the rankings suggested before the crisis on the basis of various alternative indicators.
For each indicator, we compute the success ratio, i.e. the ratio of the ex post worst 10 that would have been identi…ed as such on the basis of the indicator. In line with our previous results, the solvency ratio (CARTIER1) performs well with a success ratio of 50%, while the MES would have helped to identify only three of the ten most fragile banks. These …ndings suggest that, in cross-section, standard banking risk metrics do a better job than the MES in predicting which institution is going to be less resilient in case of an adverse systemic event.
Last, in a recent contribution, Acharya, Engle and Richardson (2012) expressed concern that the dynamic MES as de…ned above is merely a short-run indicator, and they proposed two complementary indicators meant to be more forward-looking: the long-run MES (LRMES) and the associated measure of the expected capital shortfall of a bank conditionally to a crisis, or SRISK (in dollars). Based on the same model as before, the LRMES is computed using Monte-Carlo simulations of the market and bank returns for six months in the future. Only scenarios whenever the broad market index falls by more than 40% over the next six months are kept and the LRMES is then the average cumulated expected return in the stock price of an individual bank over all these simulated crisis scenarios. The associated expected capital shortfall SRISK is then directly calculated by assuming that the book value of debt remains broadly constant over the six months period. Note that the SRISK measure incorporates both the LRMES and a measure of bank (market) leverage: SRISK i;t = E(k:(Debt i;t + Equity i;t ) Equity i;t jCrisis) = k:Debt i;t (1 k):(1 LRM ES):Equity i;t where k stands for the capital ratio imposed by the regulator (8% in their baseline).
The Systemic risk website of NYU Stern (dubbed "VLab") provides with time series of estimated LRMES and SRISK for some 100 US …nancial institutions, 19 of them being BHCs that are also present in our sample. As a last robustness check, Table 7 then presents similar correlations as Table 5 To conclude, and based on all this evidence, we thus strongly doubt that the MES can really help regulators identify systematically important banks on the eve of a future severe systemic crisis.
Conclusion
The marginal expected shortfall (MES) of a bank's stock return in case of market tail losses is a popular indicator among several recent proposals to help to monitor banks'exposure to systemic risk. Since a fall in a bank's stock return dents its equity basis, the MES hints at future probabilities of default and can be used to gauge expected losses for banks'non…nancial creditors. 13 However, for the MES to be of any practical use for macroprudential analysis and regulation, we need to better understand how it is related to usual balancesheet measures of bank fragility and we also need to check if the MES can help to predict disasters to come.
In this paper, we replicated the dynamic version of the MES proposed by Brownlees This being said, a regulator should be more inclined to monitor the MES of large banks if there is su¢ cient indication that this metric can help identify ex ante, i.e. before a crisis unfolds, which institutions are more likely to su¤er the most severe losses ex post, i.e. once it has unfolded. Unfortunately, using the recent crisis as a natural experiment, we …nd that standard balance-sheet metrics like the tier one solvency ratio are better able than the MES to predict equity losses conditional to a true and rare systemic market event. Overall, our results hence tend to weaken the case for a practical use of the MES for supervisory purposes.
A Appendix: Estimation procedure of the Marginal Expected Shortfall
To estimate the MES, we …rst model the bivariate process of …rm and market returns: r m;t = m;t " m;t (7) r i;t = i;t " i;t (8)
where r i;t and r m;t are the stock price returns of the institution i and the market respectively.
m;t and i;t are the volatilities of the market and …nancial institution i at time t; i;t the correlation at time t between r i;t and r m;t :
In this model, the disturbances " m;t ; i;t are assumed to be independently and identically distributed over time and have zero mean, unit variance and zero covariance under distribution F that will be speci…ed later on. But they are not considered as independent from each other: typically when extreme values occur, it tends to happen systematically for the most risky …rms.
Thus the MES can be rewritten more explicitly as a function of correlation, volatility and some tail expectations of the standardized innovations distribution:
M ES i;t 1 = E t 1 (r i;t j r m;t < C) (11) 
where I i;t = 1 r i;t <0 and I m;t = 1 rm;t<0 which can capture the leverage e¤ect. Indeed, it is generally acknowledged that volatility tends to increase more with negative shocks than positive ones. Note that in contrast with BE, we use Student-t standardized errors in order to better take into account fat tails. The degree of freedom of each Student-t distribution is part of the estimation set.
A.2 Correlation
The time-varying conditional correlations are modeled using the DCC approach introduced by Engle (2002) . Actually, the DCC model we use for the MES is slightly modi…ed since we also introduce asymmetry in its speci…cation following Capiello et al.
(2006).
The Variance covariance matrix is written as follows:
where R t = The standard DCC framework introduces a so-called pseudo-correlation matrix Q t , which is a positive de…nite matrix, such as
where diag (Q t ) is such that diag (Q t ) i;j = (Q t ) i;j 1 i=j :
In the standard DCC framework, Q t is de…ned as
with S being an intercept matrix, t = (" i;t " m;t ) 0 is the vector of standardized returns. Q t is a positive de…nite matrix under certain conditions which are a > 0, b > 0, a + b < 1 and the positive de…nitiveness of S. The matrix S is estimated by
As explained in Brownlees & Engle (2010), jointly negative standardized returns for example have the same impact on the evolution of the future correlation matrix in the basic DCC framework. We thus consider the Asymmetric version of the DCC as in Cappiello and al. (2006) . In this framework, the pseudo correlation matrix Q t is de…ned as
where S and N are intercept matrices and u t = t :I [ t < 0]. To ensure the positive de…ni-tiveness of the matrix Q t , we have a new set of constraints:
where is the maximum eigenvalue of S 
The asymmetric DCC model is estimated via QML. The multi-step approach of the correlation estimation as in Engle and Sheppard (2002) has been compared with alternative methodologies that …nally provide similar results. For comparison purposes with the Engle and Brownlees (2010) and estimation ‡exibility over the all set of …nancial institution considered, the multi-step approach has been adopted and only modi…ed by considering Student-t distributions for the residuals.
A.3 Tail expectations
The remaining terms to be estimated in order to obtain the MES are the two tail expectations:
E t 1 (" m;t j " m;t < ) and E t 1 i;t j " m;t < Brownlees & Engle (2010) used a non-parametric kernel estimation approach in order to estimate these tail expectations so that these estimators are not unstable when is large (we only have a small number of observations that satis…es the conditioning event in this case). Let
where k (u) is a kernel function and h a positive bandwidth.
According to Scaillet (2005) , the tail expectations can be estimated via
with
From a practical point of view, we chose a Gaussian kernel and the computation of these estimators over increasing windows starts from the 100th date t onward. Otherwise the …rst MES we compute in the sample would be too unstable. Gaussian kernels are easier to handle because optimal bandwiths for the kernel are available. These are used in our computations. The advantage of such non-parametric de…ntion of F also relies on the possible instability of the distribution over time. The non-parametric set-up allows for not relying on a speci…c family of distribution, and potentially takes into account the mixture of distributions occuring over the sample 1996-2010.
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B Appendix: List of banks in sample Table 7 : Spearman and Pearson correlation between pre-crisis bank indicators and ex post equity losses over the subprime crisis for a sub-sample of 19 BHCs present in both our initial sample and the VLAB website rankings. SRISK and LRMES variables are taken from the VLab website. *,**,*** denote signi…cance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. 
(1) , , denote signi…cativity at 1, 5, 10 percent levels. Table 8 : Cross-sectional regressions of the cumulated equity loss over the crisis (SES) on bank speci…c characteristics and individual bank MES prior to the crisis. The (dynamic BE) MES are estimated using information up to 2007Q2 only (ex ante view). Historical MES are computed over a rolling window of three years. *,**,*** denote signi…cativity at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. 
